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1 Introduction
Central banks and governments around the world are currently facing
challenging economic and monetary issues from the aftermath of the 2007 credit
crisis. Eight years after the start of the recession, the global economy still struggles to
cope with the results of the overblown credit market.
The reasons for the credit crisis are well understood. Beginning in the late
1990s, The United States government pushed a policy of homeownership that allowed
even the lowest income households to acquire real estate. This policy came with low
interest rates and lax lending standards. Consequently, housing demand rose, leading
to increasing house prices and credit volume. A housing bubble formed that
eventually burst when interest rates were adjusted to counter inflation. The Federal
Reserve Bank increased interest rates between 2004 and 2006 from about 1% to
5.25%. A large proportion of mortgage debtors with adjustable rates could not keep
up and defaulted. The financial system had not built up sufficient reserves to cope
with the high default rate. Progressively, banks had securitized mortgages to the
private, unregulated market that to a large extent was financed with debt itself. The
risk of a large-scale default in mortgages was not accounted for in the financial
market as a whole, although banks seemed safe, according to their individual balance
sheets.
The macroeconomic literature acknowledges the failure of microprudential
and monetary policy to provide measures to avoid the formation of excessive credit
and to ensure that financial institutions can cope with a bursting credit bubble. It is
now agreed that macroprudential instruments are needed, which take potential spill-
over effects between financial intermediaries into account and address systemic risks
to the banking sector.
2Which macroprudential tools are effective and what welfare effects stem from
them, is, however, not agreed upon. The literature makes several attempts to identify
appropriate macroprudential policy options, but is still undecided about the optimal
set of regulatory instruments.
This paper provides an overview of the state of the art of macroprudential
regulation as deliberated in the literature. It summarizes the findings of select papers
that reflect the course of the discussion on effective policies to counter credit bubbles
and to stabilize the financial system. The set of papers presented here is by no means
intended to be comprehensive, but rather meant to be a representative snapshot of the
current debate.
The paper starts with the general rationale of macroprudential regulation and
the importance of instruments dealing with systemic risk. The subsequent section
includes issues that arise from mortgage lending practices. The associated risk is
endemic for the recent crisis and therefore is an important parameter for determining
the effectiveness of policy options. The paper concludes by distilling the common
findings and by proposing themes for future research.
2 Rationale of Macroprudential Regulation
As it has been increasingly acknowledged that microprudential policies
addressing idiosyncratic risks of financial intermediaries are not sufficient, the
literature started to look at policy options to mitigate systemic risk of excess credit.
The dynamics of boom and bust cycles is particularly important, and the need for
countercyclical tools is identified. While earlier work focuses on the need of capital
requirements to address systemic risks, later papers consider additional instruments
such as liquidity requirements or bank closure policies.
2.1 Capital Requirements and Systemic Risk
The role of regulation for capital ratios of banks is analysed by Berger et al.
(1995). According to the authors, capital ‘requirements’ can result from market
discipline or from government regulation. Under the condition of full information and
complete markets, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition refutes that firms can
raise their value by changing their capital structure. Market prices will compensate for
any leverage decision by the firm. The optimal capital structure is chosen as the cost
of equity becomes higher with increased risk from leverage. The risk to shareholders
3increases with higher leverage, so that the cost of equity increases too, leaving the
weighted average cost of financing constant. The assumption of a frictionless world
needs to be adjusted for firms in general, taking taxes and costs of financial distress
into account, as well as asymmetric information and transaction costs. Banks are in a
particular situation that makes a departure from the Modigliani and Miller proposition
even more valid than for other firms.
First, there is a safety net for banks that exists because the government has an
interest to provide insurance for banks’ risks. This safety net includes deposit
insurance1, unconditional payment guarantees, and other bank safety regulation that
does not directly affect the capital ratio. The market requirement for a certain ratio of
equity to assets is lowered as banks are insulated from potential market discipline.
The authors point to the historical evolution of bank capital ratios in the United States.
The equity as a percentage of assets has been continuously lowered with the
introduction of several bank safety regulations. The ratio dropped from over 50% in
1840 to 6-8% in the 1940s (see Fig. 1). It stayed on this level until risk-based capital
requirements were introduced in 1990, after which it raised slightly to consistently
about 8%.
Equity as percent of assets, 1840-1993 for U.S. commercial banks.
Source: Berger et al. (1995)
1 Deposit insurance exists for example in North America, the European Union, and Australia, but
currently not in New Zealand.
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protect the government from exposure to the risks of providing the safety net, and to
protect the economy from negative externalities caused by bank failures. In other
words, the authors regard capital regulation as a means to address idiosyncratic risks
as well as systemic risks, and hence as a part of micro- and macroprudential policy.
They note, however, that capital requirements are a rather blunt tool for controlling
these risks. The value of equity and its variability is difficult to measure and monitor.
Further, capital regulation may have unintended consequences. It may give incentives
for some banks to increase their portfolio risks and their probability of failure.
Allocative inefficiencies may arise as banks divert financial resources from their most
productive use to off-balance sheet risks, such as securitization in form of off-balance
sheet guarantees, which were not subject to capital requirements and increasingly
used by banks in the 1980s. Another unintended outcome was observable in the 1990s
when risk-based capital requirements were introduced after initiation of the Basel
Accord. Banks shifted from loans to other assets such as Treasury securities. As a
result, a contraction of bank lending, the ‘credit crunch’, occurred in the early 1990s.
2.2 Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation
Allen et al. (2011) develop a simple model to show that discipline from the
asset side incentivises banks to hold positive capital, regardless of regulatory
requirements. In the model each bank lends to one firm for an investment project,
which either is successful and yields an expected payoff or not. The model takes the
amount of capital, the loan rate, the deposit rate and the unobserved effort of
monitoring by the bank into account. For simplicity, the monitoring effort also
represents the success probability of the financed project. Banks observe information
about the firms and help to improve the firms’ performance, or provide financial
expertise. The bank may not be incentivized to monitor properly as monitoring is
costly and cannot be observed by the borrowers. The bank can maximize profit by
increasing either the loan rate or the capital.
The authors compare the results of the model for the case of an unregulated
market and the case that the amount of capital is regulated. Both cases assume a
perfectly competitive credit market. Under the scenario where no deposit insurance
exists, the market solution induces banks to hold inefficiently high levels of capital
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high levels of capital as a way to commit to high levels of monitoring. With lower
project returns, the market solution (maximizing borrower surplus) coincides with the
regulatory solution (maximizing welfare), so that the market solution is constrained
efficient (efficient under incomplete markets). The result changes slightly if deposit
insurance exists (i.e. the government guarantees the deposit rate if the bank goes
bankrupt, and the deposit insurance is paid with lump sum taxes). Under this scenario,
the market solution may entail lower levels of capital and monitoring. The market
solution still may result in too much capital, or is constrained efficient coinciding with
the regulatory solution. As a result, competitive credit markets may induce banks to
hold positive levels of capital that sometimes can exceed socially optimal regulatory
levels.
The authors also relax the assumption of perfect competition. If the bank
operates as a monopolist, it will set the loan rate to the return of the project to
maximize its profit, which gives it a high incentive to monitor. If no deposit insurance
exists, the bank internalizes the cost associated with project failure and has the
incentive to monitor efficiently. In contrast, under deposit insurance, the bank has no
incentive to use any capital to commit to monitor. In that case, capital regulation can
provide incentives to monitor. With intermediate market structures between perfect
competition and monopoly (such as imperfect competition or oligopoly), the surplus
from the lending contract is split between bank and borrowers, and the effects will
remain. The more surplus banks obtain, the less capital they will use. The more
surplus goes to borrowers, the more capital banks use.
The authors find empirical evidence for the validity of their model. Banks
voluntarily hold high levels of capital above regulatory requirements, and changes in
capital regulation do not affect capital structures of banks. Also, the variation of
capital levels in accordance with the degree of competition has been found
empirically.
The authors express some reservations for the model. Foremost, they
acknowledge that the model disregards systemic risks and only covers idiosyncratic
individual risks for banks that loans are not repaid. An additional role for regulations
could stem from the fact that loan risks may spill over to other banks. The market
6solution would not internalize such a contagion risk. A regulator may therefore
require higher levels of capital than obtained with the model.
2.3 High-Quality Capital Requirements as Main Tool
The importance of requiring that financial firms have more and higher-quality
capital is stressed by Hanson et al. (2010). The authors identify two primary risks that
call for macroprudential regulation: credit crunch and fire-sale effects. Facing
microprudential capital requirements, banks may choose to cut lending in order to
shrink their assets. This might result in a credit crunch with adverse effects for the
economy. Financial firms may also choose to shrink their assets by dumping illiquid
securities, e.g. toxic mortgage-backed securities. If all firms decide simultaneously on
the same strategy, fire sales occur. Fire sales of securities make new loans more costly
as well, which further deepens credit crunches.
To counter systemic risks, several macroprudential policy tools can be
considered. According to the authors, capital requirements should be time-varying. In
‘good times’, banks should hold more capital in relation to total assets. In ‘bad times’,
the capital ratio should be relaxed in order to avoid credit crunches. The authors note,
however, that during the financial crisis of 2008 the regulatory capital requirement
was in fact not the binding constraint. In the first quarter of 2010, the four largest U.S.
banks had an average ratio of common equity to assets of 8.2%, while the regulatory
requirement was 6%. The authors conclude that “the regulatory requirement in good
times must substantially exceed the market-imposed standard in bad times” (p. 8).
They also argue for a requirement of higher-quality capital. Common equity is
friendlier to recapitalization than preferred stock, and should be the basis for
calculating the capital ratio.
Another important policy consideration the authors make is the inclusion of
the ‘shadow banking system’ in the regulation of financial markets. Excessive short-
term debt anywhere in the financial system and not only in the banking system can
pose fire-sales and credit crunch problems. An increasing fraction of consumer and
business loans are being securitized, for example in the form of asset-backed
securities. Investors that acquire asset-backed securities finance them with short-term
debt. The risks of loans are thus shifted from banks to highly-leveraged investors,
such as hedge funds, that are not subject to banking regulation.
72.4 Systemic Risk and Regulation Design
Acharya (2009) analyses the systemic risk of bank assets. Based on Allen and
Gale (2000), the author constructs a multi-period general equilibrium model with
many agents and many markets. The model allows two banks with limited liability to
invest in safe or risky assets and to choose the industry of risky investments. The
result of these investment decisions in the following period can be that both banks
survive, both banks fail, or one bank fails and the other survives. The failure of one
bank can create a “recessionary spillover” and increase the costs of the surviving bank,
thus constitute a negative externality. In the case of such a negative externality from a
default of one bank on the profitability of others, the model predicts a Nash-
equilibrium of the investment choices, in which each bank has a preference to survive
when the other banks survive, and thus to fail when the other banks fail. As a
consequence, banks’ investment decisions tend towards a high correlation of their
asset portfolios.
The author identifies a phenomenon he calls ‘systemic risk-shifting’. Banks
collectively increase the aggregate risk by investing in riskier asset classes and by
pursuing highly correlated or overall poorly diversified investments. As the likelihood
of failure of the banking system increases, risk-shifting is suboptimal for social
welfare. In contrast, if the banks invested in the lowest level of risk and as little
correlated as possible, the likelihood of joint failure would be minimized.
Based on these findings, the author discusses policy options for financial
regulation. While a bank-closure policy that bails out failing banks is assumed to be
ex post optimal, it creates moral hazard in the form of excessive risk-taking and will
therefore not be ex ante optimal. To counteract this moral hazard, the policy may
stipulate that bank owners upon bail out retain only a fraction of their equity claim.
The higher this fraction, the greater is the forbearance towards the bank. If the
forbearance policy is greater for joint failures than for individual failure, a systemic
moral hazard is generated. The government insurance to banks in the form of greater
forbearance under joint failure provides banks an incentive to have highly correlated
asset portfolios, which manifests systemic risk-shifting. The author suggests
implementing bank sales in closure policies to mitigate systemic risk. Bank sales
would increase the charter-value of banks when they survive and others fail. The
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The preference for highly correlated portfolios would be reduced.
As to capital requirements, the author observes that such policies usually fail
to address systemic risks. The collective incentives of banks remain unaffected.
Rather, capital requirements should explicitly be based on inter-bank correlations. An
optimal regulation would take account of both intra-bank and inter-bank correlations
of market risks. Prudential regulation should require banks to hold greater capital
against general risks, such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and industry,
compared to idiosyncratic or specific risks (with the same risk level). Systemic risks
would be reduced since banks are incentivised to be less correlated. The author also
notes that there is a trade-off between diversification and correlation. More diversified
banks have lower individual risks, but increase the systemic risks from correlation.
2.5 Microprudential Regulation in a Dynamic Model
De Nicolò et al. (2014) address the effect of banking regulation on welfare and
bank efficiency. Although the authors investigate microprudential instruments, they
take systematic macroeconomic risks into account. Unlike others, the authors
combine capital regulation, liquidity requirements, and prompt corrective action (PCA)
policies in a dynamic model. Capital regulation refers to a Basel II type capital ratio
that is set by the regulator according to the bank’s risk exposure. The capital ratio is
the ratio of the book value of capital to that of loans. Liquidity requirements as
introduced by Basel III refer to a minimum ratio of high quality liquid assets over the
predicted net cash outflow over a 30-day period. PCA policies force a bank to
liquidate assets or suspend payouts if capitalization falls below a pre-defined observed
level. If the bank’s ex post capital at the end of a period is negative, the distressed
bank is closed and taken over by the deposit insurance agency; that is, the bank is
expropriated from the shareholders and transferred to the government.
The authors assess the impact of these regulatory measures applying Monte
Carlo simulations on different specifications. In comparison to unregulated banks,
capital requirements increase banks’ incentives to invest more in loans and to choose
less debt. A mild capital requirement thus strengthens banks’ liquidity positions in an
economic downturn. In contrast, a liquidity requirement is more restrictive and forces
banks to reduce both debt and lending. While in an economic upturn banks reduce
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different from those attained under capital regulation only. Under PCA, the
correlation between lending, debt, capital, and liquidity ratios are similar to capital
regulation, but banks retain more flexibility to not reduce lending as much.
Similarly, the authors find, from a welfare perspective, that banks with capital
requirements lend more and have less debt, than unregulated counterparts. Mild
capital requirements are welfare enhancing as they reduce the likelihood of bank
default and banks increase lending. However, there is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between capital requirements and welfare. If capital ratios are set too high,
the optimal policy of banks is to reduce lending, which in turn reduces welfare. This
suggests an optimal level of regulatory capital depending on the individual bank’s
characteristics.
When liquidity requirements are added, efficiency and welfare decline
significantly. They undo the benefits of capital requirements and incentivise banks to
reduce lending. Liquidity regulation thus results in safe, but very inefficient banks.
PCA, on the other hand, achieves increased lending and capital, as well as
higher levels of efficiency and welfare relative to capital requirements only. Since
PCA introduces contingencies based on observed equity, it provides stronger
incentives to manage risks.
3 Systemic Risks from Mortgage Lending
Mortgages play a specific role in debt aggregation. Debtors and creditors
assume real estate as a relatively low risk investment since the financed asset serves
as a collateral with a long-term tendency to increase in value. Borrowers are often
financially inexperienced, and tend to overestimate value appreciation of houses,
especially in boom times. Confidence in the ability to repay and debt levels are
therefore high. Whether the current debt cycle is excessive is difficult to detect a
priori. Financial market regulation may reduce the risk of over-lending and the build-
up of excessive debt.
The literature discusses the optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential
policies to address specific risks from mortgage lending. The effects of loan-to-value
or debt-to-income ratios are discussed. Methods to respond countercyclically to debt
levels are evaluated. Conceptually, mortgage defaults are either seen as being
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produced by exogenous shocks, or as being part of the aggregation of endogenous
risks.
3.1 Loan-to-Value Ratio and Mortgage Valuation
Krainer et al. (2009) construct an equilibrium valuation model to test whether
the U.S. housing market crisis beginning in 2006 was caused by a failure of the
market to accurately value mortgages. They find that this was not the case, but rather
that market participants were “simply unlucky”. Forecasts generated by an accurate
model would not be able to avoid high mortgage default rates due to extreme
realizations of house price shocks. The model is successful in showing that mortgage
valuation depends on initial loan-to-value ratios, and the authors conclude that there is
no evidence of systematic under-pricing of default risk in the period preceding the
housing crisis.
Implementing data from conventional loans originated for home purchases in
California between 2000 and 2007 confirms the model’s prediction that mortgage
pricing in fact depends on loan-to-value ratios. High loan-to-value mortgages entail a
higher risk of default than low loan-to-value mortgages. For both fixed-rate
mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages, high loan-to-value mortgages have
significantly higher default rates.
The empirical analysis reveals further details on the housing market crisis. The
average loan size increased from US$ 290,000 in 2002 to $461,000 in 2006. The
average loan-to-value ratio remained unchanged at about 75%. The authors note that
the true aggregate leverage was higher than this figure, as it is only computed from
first lien mortgages. High loan-to-value borrowers, however, frequently do not
borrow the full amount using a single mortgage, but rather combine the first lien
mortgage with a second lien. Risky borrowers, as measured by their credit score
(FICO score), are more likely to receive high loan-to-value mortgages; and high loan-
to-value mortgages are more likely adjustable-rate than fixed-rate mortgages.
The proportion of subprime labelled mortgages almost tripled from 3% in
2002 to 8% in 2006. Also jumbo loans (mortgages exceeding conforming loan limits)
increased in line with house pricing from 29% to 43%. While total securitization rates
remained stable at about 84%, non-agency securitization (i.e. securities issued by
private entities) rose from 27% to 57%. After house prices in California peaked in
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2006, they fall by more than 25% until 2008. Simultaneously, delinquency rates
dramatically surged upward.
The major shortcoming of the analysis of Krainer et al. (2009) is that their
model assumes an exogenous house price shock, although they acknowledge that lax
underwriting standards possibly contributed to the price run-up. The model is not able
to detect a systemic link between mortgage underwriting practices and house prices.
As the model demonstrates, the lenders’ assessment of individual mortgage risks can
be accurate and sufficiently evaluate individual mortgages according to the risk of
default. The accumulated risk of the whole financial industry is, however, not
revealed. The growth in house prices due to laxer borrowing standards, the
accumulation of high risk borrowers, and the consequential risk of a large portion of
borrowers to default, is not captured by the model as an endogenous systemic risk.
3.2 Excess Volatility of House Prices
According to Gelain et al. (2013), the U.S. financial and economic crisis that
started in December 2007 was fuelled by excessive household debt that stemmed
from a house price bubble. They identify a self-enforcing feedback loop in which new
homebuyers had easy access to mortgages that led to an excessive run-up in house
prices. Such bubbles are difficult to detect prior to their burst because asset prices
seem to be justified by fundamental factors such as economic growth.
In order to identify policy options that may avoid bubbles, Gelain et al. (2013)
design a model that captures boundedly rational expectations of homebuyers to
explain excess volatility in house prices. Standard dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models assume fully rational expectations and treat the decline
of collateral asset values as an exogenous shock, rather than a burst of a bubble that
stems from systemic failures of debtors to accurately estimate the price development.
The authors point out that standard DSGE models would “imply that the decline in
U.S. house prices since 2007 was caused by something akin to a nationwide
infestation of wood termites” (p. 224). Instead, their model integrates subjective
forecasts of agents as an endogenous source of volatility.
In their adaptation of the DSGE model, Gelain et al. (2013) allow for hybrid
expectations: 70% of households are fully rational, while 30% employ a moving-
average forecast rule that embeds a partially self-fulfilling prediction of future house
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prices on the basis of past data. The use of a simple forecasting model acknowledges
the fact that the increase of U.S. house prices and credit was linked to the influx of
new and unsophisticated homebuyers. Excess volatility is measured relative to
fluctuations under the same model with fully rational expectations. A simulation
using the model generates volatilities of house prices and household debt that are
inflated by about 50% under hybrid expectations.
The authors assess several policy options to dampen the observed fluctuations.
The monetary policy measure to adapt interest rates in response to house-price growth
shows some benefits under rational expectations, which are limited under hybrid
expectations. Similarly, benefits from interest rate responses to credit growth
completely disappear under hybrid expectations. Under both expectation regimes,
interest rate policies magnify inflation volatility, the effect of which is more severe
under hybrid expectations. Thus, the outcome of monetary policy may depend on the
nature of agent expectations. Fully rational households understand that increased
borrowing will result in higher interest rates that in turn increase the cost of
borrowing. Boundedly rational households using a moving average of past values to
forecast prices will not take the central bank’s interest policy into account.
As to macroprudential policy, the authors find that a reduction of the loan-to-
value ratio from 0.7 to 0.5 substantially decreases volatility of household debt, but
slightly magnifies output volatility. Other volatility effects are small. Policy makers
might have to weigh the positive effect of lower loan-to-value ratios against the
negative effects of restricting households in taking up loans.
A further macroprudential policy option would be a generalized borrowing
constraint, by which lenders are required to place a substantial weight on the
borrower’s wage income. This would be a more prudent criterion than loan-to-value
ratios because income is less subject to bubbles than asset values. It also effectively
achieves a counter-cyclical loan-to-value ratio and in this way serves as an “automatic
stabilizer” for household debt. The borrowing constraint places a weight of 75% on
the borrower’s wage income for lending decisions, and 25% on the expected value of
housing collateral, leaving the steady-state loan-to-value ratio unchanged. Under
hybrid expectations, the borrowing constraint reduces volatility of house prices and
household debt, while mildly reducing volatilities of other values, or leaving them
unchanged. The magnification of inflation volatility, as caused by interest rate
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policies, is avoided. The authors conclude that a generalized borrowing constraint is
the most effective tool for dampening excess volatility. They observe that such a
lending behaviour is “basically the opposite of what was observed during the U.S.
housing boom of the mid-2000s” (p. 268).
3.3 Mitigation of News-Shock Driven Cycles
A model for boom-bust cycles in credit and house prices that are driven by
news shocks is the focus of Lambertini et al. (2013). News shocks are changes in
fundamental macroeconomic conditions that rational forward-looking agents take into
account. For example, an anticipated reduction in interest rates lets agents expect that
borrowing costs fall and house prices rise. As a consequence, housing demand,
mortgage debt and house prices increase immediately. Such upward pressure can
result from news on productivity or policy rates. Busts follow if the news is later not
realized. The model is based on two types of households, namely savers and
borrowers, that differ in their discount factors, which induces credit flows between the
two types. The model economy features a non-durable goods sector, a non-residential
investment sector, and a residential investment sector. Interest-rates vary according to
the policy of the monetary authority. The model shows that boom-bust cycles in the
housing market can be explained with expectations of future developments in
different sectors of the economy and in monetary policy.
Determining the effects of certain policy measures on the welfare of savers
and borrowers, the authors investigate the design of an optimal policy rule. They find
that a policy rule that sets the loan-to-value ratio in a countercyclical fashion can be
welfare improving compared to a constant ratio. However, if the loan-to-value ratio
responds to either house prices or GDP growth, a trade-off between the welfare of
borrowers and that of savers exists. In contrast, an optimized loan-to-value ratio that
responds to credit growth is Pareto improving.
The authors further investigate the effect of an interest-rate rule that responds
to credit or house-price growth. They find that an interest-rate rule that responds to
credit growth is superior as it improves welfare more and better reduces volatility of
credit and house prices. Such an interest-rate rule is also preferred by both types of
households, compared to the optimized loan-to-value ratio.
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Finally, the authors evaluate a combination of macroprudential and monetary
policy rules. They conclude that a countercyclical loan-to-value ratio in addition to an
interest-rate response to credit growth is socially optimal because of the large
improvements for borrowers.
3.4 Empirical Evidence on Effectiveness of Policy Instruments
Crowe et al. (2013) assess the effectiveness of several policy instruments to
deal with real estate booms. The authors note that traditional macroeconomic policies
were ill equipped to address the detrimental effects of the U.S. real estate bubble that
led to the deepest recession since the Great Depression. An optimal policy would
have two primary objectives, namely to prevent the build-up of excessive leverage
from real estate booms, and to mitigate the effects of busts by strengthening the
resilience of the financial system. The authors recognize that there is no ‘silver bullet’,
as practical and conceptual difficulties exist with each policy measure. They consider
empirical evidence from monetary policies, fiscal tools, and macroprudential
regulation.
From an empirical analysis of 19 advanced countries, the authors find that
“monetary policy could in principle stop a boom, but at very high costs.” At first, they
find little evidence of a correlation between house prices and interest rates or other
monetary measures. This can, however, be attributed to deflationary effect from the
rapid decline in import prices for goods from low-cost emerging market economies,
such as China. When accounting for import prices, the relationship becomes
statistically significant. The robustness and statistical significance improves further
when house price growth is compared to GDP deflator inflation based Taylor
residuals (i.e., inflation as expressed by GDP deflators measuring ‘discretionary’
monetary policy): looser monetary policy tends to result in an increase in house prices.
The relationship is, however, weak, and policymakers would have to drastically
increase interest rates to experience a meaningful impact on house prices. Large
effects on output and inflation would follow. Referring to the experiences in Australia
and Sweden, the authors conclude that marginal changes in interest rates are unlikely
to affect a real estate boom.
As to financial instruments, the authors find that transaction taxes empirically
have no clear relationship with house prices. Higher rates of property taxes, in
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contrast, could limit housing booms and short-term volatility around an upward trend
in prices. Neither transaction taxes nor property taxes directly target credit and
leverage, though, and thus fail to provide a link to the source of vulnerability of the
financial system. Changing the tax deductibility of mortgage interest2 could affect
loan-to-value ratios, but would be difficult to change in a cyclical manner and thus be
more appropriate for a one-off reform.
Finally, the authors assess the macroprudential tools of capital requirements,
dynamic provisioning, loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios. The empirical
evidence on capital requirements is mixed. Tighter capital requirements were
successful in some countries, and failed in others to stop booms and post-boom
damage. Even in countries experiencing some benefit, real estate appreciation and
credit growth remained strong. Borrowers and lenders may circumvent such policy
tools and find other, less regulated types of credit.
Evidence for dynamic provisioning suggests that such policy measures are
effective in strengthening the overall stability of the financial system, but are not
suited to avoid real estate booms. Requiring an extra buffer of loan loss provisions
during good times can help to cope better with potential losses, but is unlikely to
increase the cost of credit and thus to stop a boom.
Loan-to-value ratios appear to restrain house pricing. The authors find in a
simple cross-section analysis of 21 countries for the years 2000-2007 that maximum
loan-to-value limits are positively correlated with house price appreciation. A weaker
correlation between loan-to-value ratios and house price increases is found for U.S.
states in the period from 1978-2008. Practical experience with changes in mandatory
loan-to-value ratios suggests that they can be effective for short periods. Similar
patterns can be established for debt-to-income ratios.
3.5 Monetary and Macroprudential Instruments in Model of Euro Area
An optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential policy options is assessed
by Quint and Rabanal (2014). They model the situation in the Euro area, in which the
European Central Bank (ECB) sets monetary policies for the whole currency union.
As a consequence, country-specific economic cycles cannot be addressed with
2 Mortgage interest payments for the taxpayer’s personal residence are not tax deductible in most
countries, but they are in the United States (where additional tax incentives for home ownership
exist).
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monetary policy within the currency union. The model allows national central banks
to introduce macroprudential instruments that differ between countries. These
additional instruments can potentially contribute to stabilizing boom and bust cycles.
With the option of country-specific policies, the model extents the approach in
Kannan et al. (2012), but reaches similar results.
The authors construct an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model with two countries, two sectors, and two types of agents. One country
resembles the core of the currency union and is represented by aggregated data for
France and Germany. The other country signifies the periphery of the currency union
and is represented by the GIIPS nations (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).
The two sectors comprise non-durables and durables respectively, the latter of which
can be understood as housing. Savers and borrowers are the two types of agents. The
Bayesian estimation of the model parameters is based on data from the sample
countries in the period from 1995 to 2011. Five observables are used, namely real
private consumption spending, real residential investment, the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices, housing prices, and outstanding debt for households.
The model enables the authors to experiment with different policy
configurations. The performance of different policy rules is analysed using the
estimated parameter values and by incorporating several shock processes (technology,
preference, and financial shocks). First, the authors find that optimizing over the
coefficients of the estimated Taylor rule (which reacts to union-wide consumer price
index (CPI) inflation and real output growth) increases welfare of all households
slightly, but more so for savers while borrowers in the periphery lose slightly. Second,
monetary policy of the ECB is allowed to react to union-wide credit indicators, i.e.
nominal credit growth and credit-to-GDP ratio. Welfare improves with reacting to
nominal credit growth, but this is due to welfare increases of savers (borrowers’
welfare declines). Reacting to the credit-to-GDP ratio does not yield a welfare
improvement. Third, macroprudential policy measures are introduced that respond
countercyclical to domestic developments in each country. The authors do not specify
the sort of policy, and only define it as influencing the lending-deposit spread by
affecting the fraction of liabilities (deposits and bonds) that financial intermediaries
can lend. They suggest measures like additional capital surcharges, liquidity ratios,
loan-loss provisions, reserve requirements, or providing of liquidity (in case that the
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lending-deposit spread is to be reduced). The authors find that a macroprudential
policy that reacts to nominal credit growth improves welfare for both types of agents,
but does not maximize union-wide welfare. Reacting to the credit-to-GDP ratio yields
the highest welfare, but is highly divisive, since savers (especially in the periphery)
benefit greatly, while borrowers lose substantially.
As in Kannan et al. (2012), the optimal responses of monetary and
macroprudential authorities vary according to the source of the shock. When it is
optimal to reduce the countercyclical behaviour of the lending-deposit spread, as in
the case of housing demand or risk shocks, macroprudential policies may be welfare
enhancing. Under technology shocks, however, the optimal policy to any credit
aggregate is not to react with macroprudential tools, since this could magnify the
countercyclical behaviour of the lending-deposit spread.
4 Conclusion
This survey of macroprudential policy research reveals that several policy
instruments have the potential to mitigate systemic risks from credit cycles. Although
there is no conclusive agreement on the optimal policy, some insights can be obtained
that narrow down the choices of effective regulatory measures. Most likely, a
combination of several tools results in an effective oversight.
Capital requirements are a limited means to counter systemic risk. Market
discipline already incentivizes banks to maintain a certain capital ratio. In the U.S.,
the voluntary capital ratio was for over 50 years only marginally under the regulatory
requirement that was introduced in 1990. No major credit bubble had occurred during
that time. The recent credit crisis did happen despite existing capital regulation. Other
factors are clearly relevant for the stability of the financial system. Capital
requirements can have unintended consequences, such as diversion of financial
resources to riskier asset classes or increased securitization to move credit off the
balance sheet. There seems to be an optimal degree of capital ratios: too extensive
capital requirements can be as welfare decreasing as too little.
The increased use of securitization is a major contributor to the credit crisis.
The possibility for banks to move credit positions to unregulated intermediaries
creates moral hazard. Monitoring incentives for banks are reduced, and
underestimation of aggregate risks may occur. The fact that debt based securities can
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be financed with debt escalates risk and increases moral hazard. Capital regulation
must address securitization of mortgages in order to be effective. The literature fails
so far to produce specific recommendations to this extent.
Bank closure policies are an important piece in the set of macroprudential
instruments. Although a bail out policy may be ex post optimal, it creates moral
hazard in the form of excessive risk-taking. Bank sales or closure policies depending
on capital levels may correct incentives of banks to effectively monitor risks.
Monetary policies alone are not able to address risks from credit bubbles
effectively. Given that homebuyers to a large extent do not make fully rational
choices, interest rate policies may severely magnify inflation volatility. Interest rate
policies can be optimized by responding to credit growth.
Low loan-to-value ratios may combat excessive housing price appreciation
and debt bubbles from homeownership. Regulating loan-to-value ratios in a
countercyclical fashion according to credit growth may further improve welfare.
Similarly, imposing debt-to-income limits can achieve stability in the financial system.
Income is not as subject to cycles as asset prices. Also, loan-to-value ratios may be
easy to circumvent if several sources of credit are available. Income ratios are de facto
stricter. A combination of both instruments seems to be an effective way to address
credit cycles.
As a difficulty for policy makers, macroprudential policies appear to be
optimal when set in a countercyclical manner and depending on the source of shocks.
Cycles and the nature of shocks are, however, difficult to detect in advance. A balance
must be found between the avoidance of worst-case risks and the over-restriction of
market opportunities. Therefore, the design of static macroprudential requirements
may be desirable that inherently have countercyclical effects, and err on the side of
avoidance of bubbles. Further research could concentrate on finding such solutions.
Some important issues might be addressed in future research projects. First,
macroprudential policy must be seen in the context of overall financial policy (as to
the multidimensional complexity of market failures, see De la Torre and Ize, 2013).
There is little use of prudential tools if the government decides to foster
homeownership by all means, ignoring any stability considerations. The most
effective macroprudential instruments would easily be overruled by such political
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attitudes. Similarly, all financial policy instruments have to be seen together as they
interact. Macroprudential, microprudential, monetary, and tax rules all influence each
other. Further, the various rules are usually governed by different authorities, which
are motivated by different policy objectives. This is particularly prevalent in the Euro
area, but to various degrees also in other jurisdictions.
Second, there seems to be an optimal level of credit. The notion that more
lending is always better is not reasonable. Too little credit might stifle the economy.
But too much credit obviously creates even greater problems, as demonstrated by the
credit crisis. The almost paranoid avoidance of any reduction in credit volume
contradicts the goal of financial stability. Again, monetary approaches such as
quantitative easing to avoid credit crunches can accelerate the problem financial
market regulation initially attempted to solve. Other instruments to enhance
productivity may be more effective and less costly, such as reductions in consumption
taxes that are counter financed with property or wealth taxes. A holistic research on
financial market regulation may yield optimal policy choices.
Third, next to spill-over effects from one regulatory sector to another, inter-
country effects need to be taken into account in a globalized economy as well.
Regulation in one country does not protect the economy from excessive credit
aggregation since financial intermediaries are globally interconnected. Banks can
engage in global interbank lending and may have an international organisational
structure of branches or subsidiaries in several countries that could affect the outcome
of macroprudential regulation (Danisewicz et al. 2014). Finding a policy that is
accepted in all major economies adds another dimension of difficulty.
20
References
Acharya, V. V. (2009). A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank
regulation. Journal of Financial Stability, 5, 224-255.
Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Marquez, R. (2011). Credit market competition and capital
regulation. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(4), 983-1018.
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000). Bubbles and crises. The Economic Journal, 110, 236-
255.
Berger, A. N., Herring, R. J., & Szegö, G. P. (1995). The role of capital in financial
institutions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 19, 393-430.
Crowe, C., Dell’Ariccia, G., Igan, D., & Rabanal, P. (2013). How to deal with real
estate booms: Lessons from country experiences. Journal of Financial Stability,
9, 300-319.
Danisewicz, P., Reinhardt, D., & Sowerbutts, R. (2014). On a tight leash: Does banks’
organizational structure matter for macroprudential spillovers? Working Paper.
Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534525.
De la Torre, A., & Ize, A. (2013). The foundations of macroprudential regulation: A
conceptual roadmap. Working Paper No. 6575. The World Bank. Retrieved from
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2311108.
De Nicolò, G., Gamba, A., & Lucchetta, M. (2014). Microprudential regulation in a
dynamic model of banking. Review of Financial Studies, 27(7), 2097-2138.
Gelain, P., Lansing, K. J., & Mendicino, C. (2013). House prices, credit growth, and
excess volatility: Implications for monetary and macroprudential policy.
International Journal of Central Banking, June, 219-276.
Hanson, S. G., Kashyap, A. K., & Stein, J. C. (2010). A macroprudential approach to
financial regulation. Working Paper No. 10-29. University of Chicago, Booth
School of Business. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708173.
Kannan, P., Rabanal, P., & Scott, A. M. (2012). Monetary and macroprudential policy
rules in a model with house price booms. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,
12(1), 1-42.
Krainer, J., LeRoy, S. F., & O, M. (2009). Mortgage default and mortgage valuation.
Working Paper 2009-20. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Retrieved from
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp09-20bk.pdf.
Lambertini, L., Mendicino, C., & Punzi, M. T. (2013). Journal of Economic
Dynamics & Control, 37, 1500-1522.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the
theory of investment. American Economic Review (June), 261-297.
Quint, D., & Rabanal, P. (2014). Monetary and macroprudential policy in an
estimated DSGE model of the Euro area. International Journal of Central
Banking, June, 169-236.
